Seminar: Topics on the border of CS, Game theory, and Economics

 

Administrative

 

Instructor: Noam Nisan

 

Time & Place: Tuesday 2:00 to 3:45, Eilat Hall

 

Schedule

 

Date

Speaker

Topic

Slides

7.3

 

Organizational meeting

 

Purim

 

 

 

21.3

Shahar Dobzinski

Truthful randomized mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions

 

Elections

 

 

 

4.4

Michael Schapira

Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-free bidders

slides

Pesach

 

 

 

25.4

Michael Zuckerman

Testing Truthfulness for Single Parameter Agents

slides

Yom Zicaron

 

 

 

9.5

Yoram Bachrach

True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: edge deletion and VCG payments in graphs

slides

16.5

Aron Matskin

Ranking Systems: The PageRank Axioms

slides

23.5

Noam Nisan

Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items

 

30.5

Coby Fernandess

On the economics of P2P systems

slides

6.6

Liad Blumrosen

Ascending Combinatorial Auctions

 

13.6

Ilan Nehama

A Fourier-Theoretic Perspective for the Condorcet Paradox and Arrow's theorem

slides

20.6

Aron Matskin

The Agreement Structure for Generalized Matching

 

25.6(defined to be Tuesday)

Michal Feldman

Strong Price of Anarchy

 

27.6

 

 

 

  

Paper presentations

Each student must present a research paper and hand-in presentation slides. You may choose almost any paper that somehow combines computational issues or points of view with game-theoretic or economic issues or points of view. You may find papers in this category in the following places:

1.      The ACM conference on electronic commerce: 2006, 2005.

2.      Related courses and seminars in other universities: Papadimitriou (Berkeley), Parkes (Harvard), Roth&Coles (Harvard), Feigenbaum (Yale), Roughgarden&Hartline (Stanford), Tardos (Cornell), Greenwald (Brown), Sandholm (CMU), Larson (Waterloo), Tesfatsion (Iowa).

3.      Seminars given in HUJI in previous years: 2001, 2002, 2004.

4.      The following list of papers:

a.       Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method by Nolan Miller, Paul Resnick, and Richard Zeckhauser.

b.      Noise sensitivity and chaos in social choice theory by Gil Kalai.

c.       The complexity of agreement by Scott Aaronson.

d.      The communication cost of selfishness by Ronald Fadel and Ilya Segal.

e.       I will put more papers here