econcs

Topics on the border of CS, Game theory, and Economics

 

Administrative

 

Instructors:

Noam Nisan: noam@cs.huji.ac.il. Office: Ross building room 218. Office hour: Tuesday 2:003:00.

Daniel Lehmann: lehmann@cs.huji.ac.il.  Office: Ross Building room 206.  Office hour: Tuesday 2:003:00.

 

Time & Place:

Tuesday 12:00 to 1:45, Shprintzak 201.

 

Schedule

 

The first two lectures are introductory and given by the instructors.  The rest of the course is talks by students. 

 

Date

Speaker

Topic

Slides

12.3

Noam

Computers, The Internet, Games, and Mechanism Design

----

19.3

Daniel

Auctions and Combinatorial Auctions

----

Pesach

---

.

.

9.4

Ron Lavi

Frugal Path Mechanisms

PPT slides

Yom Zikaron

---

.

.

23.4

Michael Berger

Incentive Compatible Interdomain Routing

PPT slides

30.4

Yair Weinberger Avinatan Hassidim

Multi-Item Auctions

PPT slides

7.5

Matan Protter Oren Mizrahi

On approximating optimal auctions

PPT slides

14.5

Ittai Abraham

Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents

PPT slides

Yom student

---

.

.

28.5

Meir Bing

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisibilities

PPT slides

4.6

Kaplan Igor

Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice

PPT slides

11.6

Yair Cymbalista

Statistical learnability and rationality of choice

PPT Slides

18.6

Rica Gonen

Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions

PPT slides

25.6

Gedon Rosner

Graphical models in game theory

PPT slides

 

 

Papers to be presented

Each student may choose one of the papers listed below. You may alternatively suggest another paper from recent conferences or from a course in another university on the same topic. “Kol-hokodem zocheh” in terms of choosing papers and dates.  This list does not include any paper that was covered last year, nor may you choose such a paper.

 

1.      Incentive Compatible Interdomain Routing by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker

2.      Frugal Path Mechanisms by A. Archer and E. Tardos

3.      Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard by T. Roughgarden

4.       On approximating optimal auctions by A. Ronen

5.      Competitive Generalized Auctions by Fiat, Hartline, Goldberg, and Karlin

6.      Leveled commitment contracts and strategic breach by Sandholm and Lesser

7.      Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games by Jain and V. Vazirani

8.      Graphical models in game theory Kearns, Littman and Singh

9.       Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisibilities by Sushil Bikhchandani and John W. Mamer

10.  Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes by F. Gul and E. Stacchetti

11.  Substitutes, Complements and Equilibrium in two-sided Market Models by V. I. Danilov and G. A. Koshevoy and C. Lang

12.  Multi-Item Auctions by Demange, G., D. Gale, and M.Sotomayor

13.  Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice by Parkes, D. C. and L. H. Ungar

14.  Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding  by Ausubel, L. and P. Milgrom

15.     Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions by R. Holzman, N. Kfir-Dahav, D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz

16.  Statistical learnability and rationality of choice by Gil Kalai

17.  Truthful Mechanisms for one parameter agents by A. Archer and E. Tardos 

Links to similar courses elsewhere

·         Berkeley: Algorithmic Aspects of Game Theory by Christos Papadimitriou

·         Yale: Economics and Computation by Joan Feigenbaum

·         Harvard: Computational Mechanism Design by David Parkes

·         UCSB: Computation and Market Mechanisms by Subhash Suri and Rich Wolski

·         CMU: Foundations of Electronic Marketplaces by Toumas Sandholm

Links to other related courses elsewhere

·         Harvard: Market Design by Al Roth and Paul Milgrom

·         Brown: Topics in Internet agent economics by Amy Greenwald

·         Stanford: Technical Foundations of Electronic Commerce by Bonneh, Fox, Shoham, and Ullman

·         Technion: Advanced Topics in Game Theory by Dov Monderer

Link to last years’ course