"Sequential Auctions with Limited Budgets"

Speaker: Aviv Zohar, The Hebrew University
Date: Wednesday, 28 October 2009
Time: 12noon
Place: Ross 201

Abstract:

We introduce the study of sequential auctions with limited budgets. We
consider both 1st price and 2nd price auctions, and show the existence
of pure strategy equilibrium for both settings. We then focus on
revenue and efficiency properties of the auctions. We show that the
1st-price auction is inefficient in some settings, but more
surprisingly, we show that any 2nd-price auction setting possesses a
0-revenue equilibrium. Given that, we consider local modifications of
the 1st-price and the 2nd-price auctions, prove the existence of pure
strategy equilibrium in these settings, and that the modified auctions
lead to high revenue and Pareto efficiency in any equilibrium.

Joint work with Moshe Tennenholtz.